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IN 'l'.HF SUJ.'I\EME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELIZABETH JONES, 
Plaintiff a-~,d Appellant, 
vs. 
ll0J\1\1AN'S INC., A Utah Corporation, 









Corpor~Ltion, JOHN DOE, and RICHARD ROE,) 
) 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries resulting 
when a steel beam fell and struck plaintiff. 
DLSPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court granted the motions of defendants 
for sumn1ary judgment, and from that judgment, 
plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the summary judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
D~~fcndant, Horman's Inc., and defendant, Allen 
Steel Comp"'ny •'!ach filed a motion for summary 
judg1nent to be heard at the pretrial of this action 
(R. 29, 30, 31). At the ~)retrial, on May 8, 1963, said 
.tnotions V'ere considered a1:..d pb•·.-L1ti.ff requested 
leave to amend her complain~~. It .was plaintiff's 
u,·,lcrstanding that leave to amend had been granted 
and plaintiff fil~d an amended complaint on May 20, 
1963. (R. 36,37). The memorandum of defendant, 
Horman's Inc., refers to plaintiff's state1n ent con-
cerning arnending of plaintiff's coLlplaint (R. 55). 
At the pretrial, counsel were given leave to file 
memorandums (R. 35). Defendant, Horman's Inc., 
filed a memorandum on May 13, 1963, (R. 52 to 56) 
and defendant, Allen Steel Company, filed a mem-
orandum on May 20, 1963, (R. 57 to 63}. Plaintiff 
filed a reply to said memorandums on May 20, 1963, 
. 
(R. 64 to 67}. Each of said defendant's memorandums 
contained a statement of facts (R. 52, 53, 57, 58) 
which plaintiff for the purpose of argument in 
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conq,:ct' .l v.dth s,"\.1 n1otio1 _;for st<r <It1nry j:td ,-~ 
!n~;p!~ a :cep~ ,,d s ,·ttlL_ot.ant7.ally :orrcct (R. 64). 
Th'"'·c·eafter on J ,_,lc 3, 19/,3, an orde.l· was entered 
grauting said 111 nt: tl.S for s urn~ ary j udgi ~~ c nt ( ;~. 
IZ, 43). 
The record cont _ -~ns the :c> ealcd deposi _;_0 11 of 
pl~:tli- Cf (;~.50) and o:fhc!:' h• sp~_tld, Jt~l.i.u:j Earl 
Jone~, (R. 51). Neither has been unsealed or intro · 
duced hd~f) evidence (R. 50, 51). 
the 3tater.n .1t off; c:ts c ()_t·Jined J.n defen(1 ·1.nts' 
.1nemorandunls (R. 52, 53, r:7, 58) viewed most 
£2. ·orably to plaintiff: 
Defendzut, Horrnan's Inc., a general contractrJ'.:", 
was c'nl~loyed to b~·ild an adu:_:ion to the Town 
House .. Athl. i·.".c Club at 158 South 3rd East, in Salt 
La\e C ~.ty, Ut2h. D.:>ferdant, .~..\llen Steel Co-,·:1 c.::'ny, 
h:-l a :.j!i'· ~·contl'act -.vi:<h said Horman's Inc. to 
fur;j ~J: ar 1 erect the steel in said COl1.Struc ':.5. -:n job. 
C,1 -':!1e morning 0£ March 27, 1')62, plaintiff's 
h :.l ~ • -- t... _ _] - conver.:..z-~·ion with 
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?\1r. Hoffi•lC, a n1asonry subcontractor under 
said Horman's Inc., which took place at Albertson's 
~\larket at 3rd South and 4th East, Salt Lake City, Uta· 
The masonry contractor told plaintiff's husband that 
as soon as the steel was up on the aforesaid construe 
tion job, that the masonry contractor would probably 
be able to usc plaintiff's husband on that job. No 
one from either of the aforesaid defendants asked 
plaintiff's h• .s band to go to the Town House Athletic 
Club. 
On the same day, plaintiff's husband observed 
the beams being unloaded from a truck. 
On the evening of March 27,1962, plaintiff's 
hu:~band asked plaintiff if plaintiff woul.d walk to 
the Town House Athletic Club with him to see 
"how near the steel is up". Plaintiff and her 
husband walked from their aparbn ent to the said 
site, arl'iving about 7:30p.m. that evening. Plaintiff' 
husband did not observe any workmen or other 
persons on the premises. When plaintiff and her 
husband arrived at the s ·.tc2 plaintiff was tired so 
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hc~r h1t>h<1nd pl::.ced a building block on the ground 
for her to sit on. The block '.vas placed on the 
ground adjacent to large steel r,ir.lcr:~, about 80 
fee:, lo g, 2 to zt feet wide at the ends and about 5 
feet .vide in the center. The t) ··-:lers were laying 
ea:3t to west, and had been set on edge in a drive-
way which had been dug down to he bottom of the 
foundation of the buildi tg so equipment could b..; 
taken out of the bas erne nt, and_ !h~~ girders were 
mostly i.n the driveway, but the ends were pro-
trudb1g <-lbove the ground level of the ramp. A 
2 :< 12 was bol ~d to the top of the girders, and 
they were held tog-ether by a 1 x L~ nailed across 
the top. · 
While plaintiff was sitting on the building b1r~ck 
facing to the south a1d her husband was looking at 
the building,_ th·:> steel g5.rders tipped over. Plaintiff 
did not see th;:·ln fall, but her husband heard the 
beams bump against each other as they started to 
fall and grabbed plaintiff, pulling her toward the 
south. Plaintiff suffered a scraped back and a 
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LJ okcn 'oc 8 .1 result of the ;)ccidcnt. 
POINT 1 
THE DIS 'TRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
THE ~. , JTIONS OF DEFENDANTS FOR SU!v1MARY 
J UDG .· (ENT, BECI USE IT CANNOT BE SAID AS A 
MATTER O..t.<' LAW THAT ·· ~·..JAINTIFF W.P..S NOT AN 
INVITES. 
As is often the case in appeals from summary 
judgments, the .record is not very corrprehensive 
in this case. 
In the case of Thompson v. Ford Motor Company, 1 
Case No. 9807, decided August 13, 1963, the Supreme 
Court of Utah held that it could. not consider sealed 
depc .. sitions and will only look to the record proper 
to determine the issues. rfhus the depositions may 
not be considered. Any defect in plaintiff's complaint 
must also be ignc c.·ed as concerns the summary judg-
mcnt because of the proceedure followed to present 
the facts to the court for purpos ~s of s um :-o ary 
judg;nent. Had the court denied the motions for a 
su~ 1n1ary 5 '-ldgmr~nt, it would undoubtedly have entered 
a p.cetrial or "r which uncle :.btedly would have con-
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taincd an order granting pl ti:·Liff leave to amend. 
Defendants m ainl aineu that unde1 the facts 
contained in their n1emor:.ndwn, the defendants 
owed 1>laintiff no duty blcause, as a matter of law, 
plaintiff was eiLhLJ. (1) a tresspasser, or (2) R 
licensee anc: that as a matter of law plaintiff's 
injuries were not the result of wilful or wanton 
conduct, nor of active negligence nor was this a 
case where defendants knew of the dangerous con-
dition a11.d defendants had reason to believe that 
plaintiff would not discover the condition. Plaintiff 
maintained and argued that plaintiff was an invitee 
and that in any ev _;nt it can't be said as a matte1· of 
law that pla~ntiff was not an invitee. 
Thus the issue of plaintifr s status as an invitee, 
licensee or tresspasser was presented to the 
district . court under the facts set out in the memo-
randtm1s, and the only issue on appeal thus, is 
whether under these same facts, it can be said as 
a matter of Ltw plaintiff was not an invitee and also 
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.. il .-!,. ~icensee that as a m ttte c of law plainti1·r· s 
injuries were not the result of wilful or wanton 
conduct and were not the result of active negligence 
and that defend ants did not know of the dangerous 
condition or if they did, defendants had no reason 
to 1.:1 i.eve that pJ.aintiff would not discove1· it. 
Plait1t:i.ff contends that she was an invitee at the 
time she was injured and that in any event, it 
cannot be s:1id "as a matter of law that she was not 
an i:nvitee. 
The definition of an invitee is a question of law. 
Whether or not plaintiff is an invitee is a question 
of fact for the· jury, unless reasonable minds could 
only reach the conclusion that plaintiff did not fit 
the definition. 
Viewing tre facts most favo"t"ably to the plaintiff, 
as the court is required to do in ruling on a motion 
for summary judgment by ~e~endants, plaintif~'s 
husband w·ent to the said job site to see how far 
along they were with tb~ steel, because the masorry 
contrac~~or for said job had told him that when the 
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'; 
steel was up he would ,)robably be •~ble to u~,e him 
on tl~Ztt job. It as, )f c JUrse, necessary for pla-'.n-
iiJL's husband to follow the pror;.rc..;s o; ~-he work in 
ord cr to l;-; LOW when to contact the masonry contrac ·· 
tor again about the job. In going : o said job si~e, 
p L dntiff' s husband was perform :i ng a task which the 
m;~.sonry contractor had thus by implication given 
him, to-wit: to keep track of the progress of work at 
said job site. It car~ 1oi be said as o. matter of law tha 
plaintiff's husband perforrr)ed this task in an urJ~e:t­
sonablc manner or in an area to which his invitation 
did 1~ot extend. Plaintiff's husband was on the job 
site for a legitin1ate reason, for a reason related 
to the defendants construction business, and for a 
reason of mutual interest to plaintiff's husband and 
defendants, to-wit: the masonry work on said job. 
This was especially of interest to defendant, Horman~ 
Inc., the general contractor. 
It has been held that an employee of a subcontrac 
tor is an invitee of the main contractor. See Florez 
v. Groom Development Co,, 53 C.&I347,348 P. Zd 200 
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The same rule should apply bctYJeen a sub-
contractor and an employee of another sub-
contractor. 
--~--------------------------------
Logically the rule should be the same for a 
wo:r:kma.n who is negotiating for ~mployment as 
for one who has already been employed. The idea 
of mutual advaptage is present in both cases. 
Where a person enters the premises for a· 
purpose related to the occupant's business or for 
a purpose that involves some matter of mutual 
business interest, or advantage, an invitation to 
use the premises _may be inferred. When the 
masonry contractor had been engaged to perform 
work upon said job site, then the activities of said 
masonry contractor on said job site in furtherence 
of his contract would be of mutual interest and 
. 
advantage to defendants. If, pursuant to his contract 
the masonry contractor found it .necessary to em-
play-workers, then this too is a matter of mutual 
busine · terest an v antage, to defendants; 
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likewise, since negotiations and planning for such 
empbyment ar(; a necessary part of employn1ent, 
they too are of mutual business interest, and advan·· 
tage to dc.l.endants. In this case, the presence of 
plaintiff's husband at said job sih~ was a part of 
the negotiations and planning between th~ masonry 
contractor and plaintiff's husband. In the case of 
Hayward vs. Downing, 112 Utah 508, 189 P. 2nd 442 
(1948), the cou1·t sa:·d: 
".An invitee is ordinarily one '\vho goes upon 
the prerlis es of the owner or occupant for the 
purpos · of trans acting business, or for the mutual 
bcnefi:. of each of them, or for the benefit of the 
occupant. He may be expressly invited to come 
upo1• the premises, bu i; more commonly his invi-
tatio.u is implied.'' 
Plaintiffs husband did not go to said site for his 
own advantage only. It therefor seems clear that 
plaintiff's hus.band was aninvitee. 
The next question presented is whether plaintiff, 
who accompanied her husband to said job site, is 
entitled to the same status as her husband. In the 
case of Brigman vs. Fiske-Carter Construction 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
773, the t)J.aintir·cwent u,~_~n :~·.c p1·emi.ses of the 
dcr ~1·\' :1ltt in cornpany wHh her hu::b~lnd who had 
been exr· .. ·css 1 '/ :i.nv:i.ted to conle upon t..he premises 
to seek ernployn1ent. The court held in that case 
that the wife was an ii.nplie•: invitee. the cou~t stated: 
"She was neither wan~ erjng over the premise 
Lor ther.'uron by reason of id.le curiosity or upon 
a mission Y:hich coul,l fairly be said to be wholly 
disconnected from the company's business. Her 
t•.nsband h~d been exr:.ressly invited to come upon 
the premis,.es to seck employment. He therefore 
hal~ a right to go upon the premises; he had a rigb 
to p:1rk his car near the roadway in the space 
des: 1ated by defendant for such purpose. The 
car of the husband was there as a result of the 
invitation of the defendant and certainly the plain-
tiff had a ri.ght to go with her husband a ld to re-· 
n1 ,_i_n in the car which was upon the premises at 
a proper place, by invitation of defendant, without 
bee )lTiing a trespasser or mere permissive 
licensee. In truth, the p 1 ~: .. intiff's presence upon 
the pren1ises cf defendant was the result of the 
principles of implied invitation. Her status was 
that of impU.:d invitee ... " 
The c'.ifference between the Brigman case, supra, 
.. ld the pl'esent case is that there the ~1usband was 
an exprG~ s invitee and L1e plaintiff's wife an in1plied 
invitee, wl, (: ,_·eas here the invitaf:ion of both husband 
and vife was implied, but the same rule should in 
principle ap·?lv here. 
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In the case of Fortune v. Southern Ry. Co. 
150 N.C. 695,645. E. 759, the plaintiff ... ;_fe 
boarded a railroad passenger car to bid her 
husband good··bye, h~ being a passenger. She was 
injured while leaving. The court said at page 760: 
"Her presence there was not wrongful, 
be ·· "l.u~ c a wife who escorts a bus band or a 
husb ;tnd a wife to a seat on a railway train is 
not a mere trespasser to whom the company 
owes no duty except to bstain from willful 
injury. It is true plaintiff w :·. ~, not a passenger 
towards whc•lTI the defendant \ .1 as bound to exercise 
the highest degree of care, but she was on its 
premises by its impFed invitation, and it was bound 
to exercise ordinary c:are for her safety. Raih,,. ay 
companies owe this duty at least to those who 
in pr<".. ctice they allow to accompany passengers 
in order to see them off on trains without asking 
special permission ... This implied L1vitation and 
consequent duty to those who impelled by ties of 
relationship and affection go to 'welcome the 
coming or speed the parting guest' :ls founded on 
recognized social observances which have become 
a universal and inseparable concomitant of 
modern railway traffic.'' 
Thus in the Fortune case the court found an 
implied invitation for the wife, accompanying her 
passenger husband, not only to come upon the loading 
platform, but to board the car itself to say good- bye. 
Although that court talked in terms of a railway 
Hs decision 
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has rcco:~nL'ed a 1nore basi.c concept, na.u1ely, · 
that in many clSpl;Cts of life, a spouse \<.Jtll 1uite 
naturally accornpany her spouse on m attcrs which 
not.'e specifically concern the one but r:~.t least in 
a general way concern the other. In view of this 
tr.•it of human naLtre, it seems artificial to say 
that the husband is entitled to one status but .not the wiJ 
unless know ingly violating some well established 
rule. 
In the case of T-alus v. Be1.·~ s, 122 Md. 467, 89 Atl. 
731, .:\nn. Cas. 1916A 985, the court held in e.L(ect 
that :.t could not be said as a rn .- tter of law that 
\\ l1ere a father wa-:; invited to :i.~·;;:;pect some rooms for 
.. ossible te ~Zlncy, t lt p-,e plaintiff son, who accom-
pa1 ;ed the father, but \.\ho was not present v;hen the 
father was invited to view the premises, was not an 
t- in1l)lied invitee. 
\ 
T:1u.=· '1gain in the Kalus case the court recocJrized 
that in certain cases hUlTian nature indicates that 
a rnan \Tiill be accompanied by a family member 
an~ t~~f the farr :_lv member ;an be an implied 
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invitee. 
The case of \Vheaton v. Goldblatt Bros., Inc. 
15 N. E. 2nd 64, seerns to have found that a 
12 year old girl, who accompanied another wo1nan 
to a store on a shopping tour, was an invitee, and it 
doesn't appear that they were related. 
It is stated in Pross er on T9rts_ -- 2nd Ed. ai. 
page 454: 
"Children and friends who accompany custon1ers 
with no intention of buying anything themselv cs, 
people who come to r:·dlway stations to n1 eet 
pass2ngers or see thc1n off, guest~. in automobiles 
who go with d ·dvers to ;·~ arages, fi1 .ing stations 
or par , ing lo: ::3 , tourists who v .: sit factories at 
the h -.r.itation of the owner, t1 1 ose who bring ern-
ploy ,. cs their lunch with the encouragetnent of 
the n1an8.gement, and even possible purchasers 
who look at displays in shop windows, or who 
desjre on the particular occasion only to use a 
toilet or a telephone open to the_ public, or even 
the man who goes into a bank to change a five 
dollar bill, all have been held to be invitees.'' 
In a note in 44 ALR 2d 1319 at page 1329, it is said: 
"In the great n1ajority of cases the viewpoint 
is taken C1at where a child accompanies 8.nothc.r 
person who enters a store for the purpose of busi-
ness dealings not involving the child, su:h cb.ilu 
is nevertheless an invitee. In other words, th e 
question whether or not it '~vc..:· necessa1·y fol' the 
customer to have the child with hhn in order to 
shop is im1n aterial in determining the chi1d' s 
st - as a business visitor.'' 
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POINT 2 
THE DISTRICT COUl\T ERRED IN GRANTING 
THE MOTIONS OF DEFENDANTS FOR A SUlvUv!AHY 
JUDGMENT, BECAUSE IT CANNOT BE SAID AS A 
MATTER OF LAW: (1) THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT 
INJURED BY WANTON CONDUCT; (2) THAT DEFEN-
DANTS DID NOT KNOW OF A DANGEROUS CONDITIO 
ON SAID PREMISES OR THAT IF THEY DID KNOW 
THEREOF THAT DEFENDANTS HAD NO REASON TO 
BELIEVE THAT PLAINTIFF WOULD NOT D.lSCOVER 
THE CONDITION. 
Even it plaintiff is only a licensee, defendants are 
not relieved of all duty toward her~ Certainly under 
_j 
the circumstances of this case it cannot be said as a 
matter of law that plaintiff was a trespasser and thus 
at the very least there is a jury question as to whethe 
or not plaintiff is a lie ens e e. ' If plaintiff is a lie ens ee 
.1 ·· · 
then defendants O\ved her a duty to refrain from want 
conduct injuring her. See Sanders· ·v. Brown, 
73 ·Ariz. 116~ 238 P. 2d 941 {195.1) .. It cannot 
be said as a matter of law that fastening 80 foot 
girders together with a 1 x 4 nailed to them, where 
the girders are standing on edge partly on a ramp 
and pa:..·tly up in the air is not wanton conduct. 
Further, if plaintiff is a licensee, defendants O \ \ 
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had reason to believe that plaintiff would not discover 
it. See Vfood v. Wood, 8 Utah 2d 279, 333 P. 2d 630 
(1959). Such knowledge and belief can be implied, 
and in most cases will have to be established by 
implication. It cannot be said as a matter of law 
that such an inference cannot be made under the 
facts in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the district court erred 
in granting defendants' motions for summary judg-
ment, and that judgment should be reversed, and 
plaintiff given the opportunity to amend her complaint 
and present the issues of fact herein to a jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
John E. Stone and 
Robert C. Cummings 
705 Utah Savings Building 
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